Tuesday, December 28, 2010

ἐνκομίον or encomium

ἐνκομίον (enkomion) or encomium is the eighth of the ancient progymnasmata and is, according to Hermogenes,
"an exposition of the good qualities of a person or thing." (Hermogenes, 14, Kennedy).
This is a very broad definition, but an encomium is merely a speech of praise about a person.  The progymnasmatists expand greatly on this topic, providing several areas or topics one can use to praise a person. For example,  there are external goods such as place of birth, occurrences at birth, nurture, upbringing, education. Goods of the body (health, strength, etc.).  Then there are internal goods such as goods of the mind (intellect, wisdom), virtues (justice, bravery).  Then there are actions and deeds (to which I would also add speech).  Finally, there is the manner of death and what happened after death.  The student, taking these topics, can pick and choose from them which would be most flattering to his or her subject.

About manner of birth, Hermogenes says,
"You will mention also any marvelous occurrences at birth, for example, from dreams or signs or things like that." (Hermogenes, 15, Kennedy).
 Reading the birth narratives of Jesus in the gospels of Matthew and Luke read like an encomium of Jesus.  Especially in regard to Hermogenes' last comment, the birth of Jesus was surrounded by numerous "dreams or signs or things like that."  From Matthew, Jesus birth is preceded by a miraculous star in heaven.  Dreams are given to Joseph.  The baby is born of a virgin.  From Luke's gospel, angels appear, visions are given to Mary.  The baby is born of a virgin.  All of these things are commonplaces for the birth of an important individual.

The genealogies also function as part of the encomium.  In both Matthew and Luke, Jesus is given a royal lineage with many impressive figures. 

We get nothing from Matthew about Jesus' nurture upbringing, or education.  But, in Luke, we get one scene that pertains to Jesus' education.  There is the short episode in Luke chapter two about Jesus in the Temple at the age of 12.  We are told that those who heard Jesus speak "were amazed at his understanding and his answers." (Luke 2:47).  This verse serves to fill in the education portion of the encomium of Jesus.  It does not give the means of Jesus' education, but the outcome, namely that Jesus at the age of 12 was able to amaze the experts in the Temple.

The rest of the gospels fill out the encomium, dealing with Jesus' actions, deeds, and speech, finally ending with his death and what happened after his death.

Friday, December 24, 2010

The Friday Figure

This week's Friday Figure is a two for one and comes from the Gospel of Luke:
Luke 6:46    Τί δέ με καλεῖτε· κύριε κύριε, καὶ οὐ ποιεῖτε ἃ λέγω;
Ti de me kaleite: kyrie kyrie, kai ou poieite ha lego
Why do you call me Lord Lord and do not do what I say? 
This verse contains two figures.  The first is with the repetition of Lord (kyrie) twice in a row which forms the figure epanalepsis.  Epanalepsis is usually used for emphasis or to heighten the emotional appeal.  The second figure is that this verse, unlike Matthew's parallel material (Mt. 7:21) is a rhetorical question.  By using the rhetorical question, Luke draws the audience into his argument as participants. 

Monday, December 20, 2010

Inception and the Rhetorical Question

One of the best movies of the year, imho, is Inception.  The remarkably creative, mind bending, surreal story of dream invasion and manipulation, is, at its heart, a story about persuasion.  The story is about implanting an idea in someone's head so that they take it on as their own, so that they own the idea, believe in the idea, and act on the idea. 

This got me thinking about how the rhetorical figure of speech rhetorical question aims at much the same goal.  The cleverly worded rhetorical question is a question that needs no answer, that only has one answer.  Yet, the effect on an audience of a rhetorical question comes in actually answering the question, of giving one's own answer, of owning the answer.  Therefore, through rhetorical question, the speaker makes his or her idea that of the audience.

Take for example the Lukan Jesus' exchange with the synagogue leader in Luke chapter 13.  On the Sabbath Jesus has just cured the "bent" woman after her 18 years of suffering.  Here is the exchange:
Luke 13:14 But the leader of the synagogue, indignant because Jesus had cured on the sabbath, kept saying to the crowd, “There are six days on which work ought to be done; come on those days and be cured, and not on the sabbath day.”
Luke 13:15 But the Lord answered him and said, “You hypocrites! Does not each of you on the sabbath untie his ox or his donkey from the manger, and lead it away to give it water?
Luke 13:16 And ought not this woman, a daughter of Abraham whom Satan bound for eighteen long years, be set free from this bondage on the sabbath day?”
Luke 13:17 When he said this, all his opponents were put to shame; and the entire crowd was rejoicing at all the wonderful things that he was doing.
The Synagogue leader makes this an issue of law.  Jesus makes it an issue of compassion.  Jesus does not directly respond to his opponents accusation.  Instead, he takes his position, that it is right to heal on the Sabbath, and crafts two rhetorical questions.  To both questions, there is only one answer.  Yes, those listening will have compassion on their donkeys on the Sabbath, and Yes, this woman ought to be set free on the Sabbath.  Yet, instead of just stating his idea, Jesus places his view in the form of the rhetorical question so that his idea now becomes that of the audience.  They supply the answer to the question.  They now own the answer.  They are now convinced.  Luke's narration of the response of Jesus' opponents is telling: the audience has now owned Jesus' view and thus put Jesus' opponents to shame.  Jesus, through rhetorical question has implanted this idea in the minds of the audience and they have made it their own. 

Friday, December 17, 2010

The Friday Figure

I have been derelict in my duty, not posting a Friday Figure in a few weeks.  But here is this week's Friday Figure, from Matthew's gospel.
Matt. 7:2 ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε, καὶ ἐν ᾧ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν.
en ho gar krimati krinete krithesesthe, kai en ho metro metreite metrethesetai humin
for with the judgment you judge, you will be judged, and with the measure you measure out it will be measured to you. 
 This verse has two examples of the figure paronomasia, which the Rhetorica ad Herennium defines as:
"The figure in which by modification of sound or a change in letters, there is a close resemblance between verb or noun, so that similar words mean dissimilar things" (Ps-Cicero, Rhet. Her, 4.21.29-4.23.32). 
I have tried to translate this verse to keep some of the figure.  In this case, the words that are similar are the three words dealing with judgment and the three words dealing with measurement.  In English, even trying to keep the figure does not quite replicate the Greek language.  In the Greek, all three words that are similar come in direct succession with no intervening words.  This makes for a nice ornamental effect that is unfortunately impossible to reproduce in translation. 

Sunday, December 12, 2010

Rhetoric Wars: Church Marquees

In general I dislike church marquees.  I think that most of the messages on church marquees are so banal that that they should be left off altogether.  Then my attention was drawn to the following use of church marquees: start a battle of words and wits with a cross town church.  If done right, like here, I love it.  HT to Scott McKnight at Jesus Creed.

Round 1: Draw, two unprovable claims
 Round 2: Our lady of the Martyrs, unsubstantiated claim and premature attempt to stop debated by the Presbyterians.
Round 3: Our Lady of Martyrs: levity, Presbyterians, too caught up on this "soul" thing.
Round 4: Our Lady of Martyrs: Levity, Presbyterians, What?
Round 5: Our lady of Martyrs: How do you come back from that>  At least the Catholics still have a sense of humor.

Thursday, December 9, 2010

τοπός and κοινός τοπός, topic and commonplace

Seventh in the list of ancient progymnasmata was the exercise of τοπός (topos, topic) or κοινός τοπός (koinos topos, commonplace." Topos literally means place, and a commonplace, in practice is a fount of stock arguments.  Theon says the following:
"It is called a topos because starting from it as a 'place' we easily find arguments." (Theon, 106, Kennedy).
Theon gives examples of commonplaces of good and bad men.  For example, bad commonplaces for people are "tyrant, traitor, murderer, profligate," and for good people, "tyrannicide, hero, lawgiver."

Once one has established a commonplace, one can elaborate it in several ways, through comparison, past events, future events.  Theon gives an example of a comparison between a temple robber and a thief.  He writes:
"If the thief is punished for taking men's money, how much more will this man be punished for looting the possession of the gods?" (Theon, 108, Kennedy).
 In many ways then, the commonplace is a way of labeling someone or something, and then using stock arguments that are common to that type of person or thing.

There are several good examples of the commonplace in the New Testament.  The following example comes from I Peter, where the author gives a commonplace, i.e., Gentiles, and then lists deeds common to Gentiles:
1Pet. 4:3 You have already spent enough time in doing what the Gentiles like to do, living in licentiousness, passions, drunkenness, revels, carousing, and lawless idolatry.
Once the label "Gentile" is used, it opens up an entire list of stock arguments against Gentiles. Thus, the commonplace is a starting place from which to draw arguments.  Notice, that commonplaces are always general, and they border on the stereotypical, but are nonetheless useful for finding arguments. 

Wednesday, December 8, 2010

ἀνασκευή and κατασκευή, refutation and confirmation

ἀνασκευή (anaskeue, refutation), and κατασκευή (kataskeue, confirmation) are the fifth and sixth in the list of the ancient progymnasmata.  These two exercises consist of arguments for or against some argument, narrative, fable, maxim, etc.  In teaching students to refute an argument, the exercise draws on stock arguments, or topoi (topics).  These are the unclear, implausible, impossible, inconsistent, inappropriate, or not beneficial.  To confirm an argument, narrative, fable, maxim, etc., one should use the opposites.

A good example of a refutation from the inconsistent comes in Luke 20:41-44.  Jesus is apparently responding to a certain conception of the Messiah as the Son of David.  In what I believe is an attempt to confuse his opponents, Jesus refutes the concept of the Messiah as the son of David by pointing out inconsistencies in his opponents narrative.
Luke 20:41  Then he said to them, “How can they say that the Messiah is David’s son?
Luke 20:42 For David himself says in the book of Psalms,
    ‘The Lord said to my Lord,
    “Sit at my right hand,
Luke 20:43         until I make your enemies your footstool.” ’
Luke 20:44 David thus calls him Lord; so how can he be his son?”
 In this case the refutation lies in the inconsistency of David calling his son Lord. 

Wednesday, December 1, 2010

γνώμη or maxim

The Greek γνώμη (gnome) or maxim is the fourth exercise in the list of the classical progymnasmataTheon does not treat maxim as a separate exercise but discusses it along with the exercise on chreia.  Nicolaus the Sophist defines maxim as follows:
"Maxim is a general statement, giving some counsel and advice for something useful in life." (Nicolaus 25, Kennedy).
Maxim is also a figure of speech and is defined by the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium as,
"A saying drawn from life which shows concisely either what happens or ought to happen in life." (Ps-Cicero, Rhet. Her. 4.17.24).
Maxims are therefore usually short sayings giving some advice.  They differ from chreia in two ways: 1) they are always sayings whereas chreias can be either sayings or actions, and 2) Maxims are usually anonymous whereas chreias are always attributed to a specific person. 

There is obviously a significant amount of overlap between chreias and maxims, and the distinctions do not seem to be overly important except for classification purposes.  This is especially true because all of the exercises used for chreias are also suggested for maxims.  Thus, with a maxim, one can expand or contract, elaborate, confirm, refute, and repeat with slightly different language.

If we hold to the strict definitions given by the progymnasmatists, all of the sayings of Jesus are chreias and not strictly speaking maxims.  Yet, if one is going by the lists of figures of speech, maxim seems to be the proper figure for the sayings of Jesus.

Several good examples of maxims come in the Sermon on the Mount with the antitheses of Jesus where he says, "You have heard it said... but I say to you."  In each case Jesus gives a saying that was common, usually from the Old Testament, but he does not give a specific attribution.  In one case, the text is not from the OT:
Matt. 5:43 “You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’
In these cases Jesus cites some commonly held saying in the form of a maxim only to refute it with his own chreia.

Tuesday, November 30, 2010

χρεία

The χρεία (chreia), which could be translated as "anecdote" but is usually left untranslated, is defined by Theon as:
"a brief saying or action making a point, attributed to some specified person or something corresponding to a person." (Theon 96, Kennedy)
The chreia is usually the third exercise in the ancient progymnasmata
 
A chreia is thus a very broad category of either sayings or actions.  What distinguishes it from a maxim is that a maxim can be anonymous, and only in a chreia can there be actions as well as sayings.

Much work has been done on the chreia in New Testament studies, so I will try not to rehash that information here (see Hock, Ronald F. and Edward N. O'neil. The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric: Classroom Exercises. Leiden: Brill, 2002.).

The chreia, having such a broad definition, makes it useful for evaluating much of the work in the New Testament.  Almost any brief saying or action done by Jesus in the gospels could be considered a chreia and evaluated according to the discussions of the preliminary exercise.

One interesting example might be the story of the woman caught in adultery in John chapter 8.  Theon says that chreias can be verbal, actional, or mixed.  That is, a chreia can be a saying, or an action, or may contain both.  The story in John 8 would be a mixed chreia containing both saying and action.  Twice in the story Jesus bends down and write in the dirt, hence the action part of the chreia.  But, he also adds a saying, "Let anyone among you who is without sin be the first to throw a stone at her," hence the verbal part of the chreia.

Some of the interesting aspects of chreias are that they can be inflected in different grammatical cases, expanded or contracted, confirmed or refuted, and restated.  Of specific interest to NT scholars might be the idea of expansion or contraction of sayings.  For example, in source critical discussions it is often assumed that the shorter version of a saying is the more original.  Yet, with the knowledge of the progymnasmata, it becomes clear that students learned both to expand and contract source material, erasing the certainty of the more original form.

Wednesday, November 24, 2010

διήγημα and διήγησις or narration and narrative

The second of the preliminary exercises in the progymnasmata is narrative.  Hermogenes makes a distinction between διήγημα (diegema, narrative), and διήγησις (diegesis, narration), the first being the part, the second, the whole.  That is a diegema is a short narration of an event which is part of a larger whole of a diegesis or narrative.  Thus, the story of Jesus healing of a blind man in Mark 8 is a diegema whereas the gospel of Mark is a diegesis.

Theon lists six aspects of narrative: (1)Person (prosopon), (2) Action, (3) Place of Action, (4) Time of Action, (5) Manner of Action, and (6) Cause of these things.

For some time now, New Testament criticism has engaged in literary analysis of the NT.  One criticism of that type of analysis has been based on terminology, namely that the concepts and terminology for literary criticism is based on modern literature which may or may not correspond to the terminology of ancient literature.  I think that this is a potent criticism.  Yet, looking at the progymnasmata, we can come up with an ancient terminology and see how it might correspond to modern literary terms.

For example, in the list above, many of the terms used can be related to modern literary terms.  Person can go with Character.  Action with Plot, Place and Time with Setting.  So, we can begin to build an ancient literary criticism using the progymnasmata. 

This can be more fully carried out as one continues with Theon's list of properties of Person (prosopon).  Thses lists are called topoi lists from the Greek topos. Theon writes:
"The properties of Person are origin, nature, training, disposition, age, fortune, morality, action, speech, death, and what followed death." (Theon 78, Kennedy).
Using these categories, one can start to build an ancient view of character, or as modern literary criticism would say, "characterization."  That is, these are the aspects through which the ancients looked at a character.

Michael Martin, in a recent article, has persuasively argued that the topoi lists found in the progymnasmata, can be viewed as a template for ancient biographies, specifically the gospel of Luke.  See Micheal Martin, "Progymnastic Topic Lists: A Compositional Template for Luke and other Bioi?," New Testament Studies 54 (2008), 18-41.

Tuesday, November 23, 2010

Memory and Figures of Speech

This year I actually attended more sessions at this SBL than I think I ever have.  Amidst a number of (mostly mind-numbing) presentations, one stood out, at least for my area of research.  The presenter was Dr. Robert K. McIver from Avondale College, and, aside from his great Aussie accent (or was it Kiwi? I can't tell the difference), his topic was fascinating. 

His primary thesis was that there are two types of memory: gist memory and verbatim memory.  He noted that if a person is asked to listen to a story or piece of information, and then later asked to repeat that information, the type of memory used is "gist" memory.  That is, a person can remember the gist of what was said, but rarely uses the same wording.  Yet, if the information comes in aphorisms, then the information is often remembered "verbatim," or at least fairly closely. 

McIver used two pools of data.  The first pool was the double tradition from the synoptic gospels.  He found that there was "gist" correlation between narrative material in Matthew and Luke, but "verbatim" or near verbatim correlation between the aphoristic material in the two gospels.  The second pool was some controlled experiments he did with his students in which he asked them to repeat information.  He found the same correlations: "gist" correlation with narrative material and "verbatim" correlation with aphoristic material. 

McIver was interested in looking at the composition of the gospels, specifically with possible oral tradition.  What interested me is the possible connection with the third chapter of my dissertation in which I argued that Luke used powerful and "memorable" figures of speech to communicate his role-reversing message.  What McIver referred to as aphorisms, I would argue can actually be classified more specifically as figures of speech.  I argued that where the Lukan Jesus' message was most likely to run counter to the Greco-Roman value systems, he embedded that message in easily memorable and memorizable figures of speech.  Placing this information in this form helped his message to take root in the minds of the audience.  McIver's work  bolsters my argument and I would love to pursue this work further. 

Robert K. McIver, Avondale College, "Oral Performance, Memory Capacity, and the Aphorisms of Jesus," SBL national Conference, Atlanta, GA, 11/21/2010. SBL Bible in Ancient and Modern Media Section.

Sunday, November 21, 2010

Rhetoric of presentations at the SBL

In pedagogy training as teachers we are taught not to rely on a manuscript. We are taught to know our material and to talk normally. We are taught not to use jargon, but to translate our ideas into readily intelligible phrases. Yet, you arrive at the SBL expecting the opposite.
Speakers reading from a manuscript filled with jargon is the norm. Sometimes, if your mind slips and you miss a definition, the remaining minutes of a paper become an endless stream of meaningless words.

Few people can actually read from a prepared manuscript well. Bruce McCormack at Princeton Seminary is one of the only few that I have seen do this well on a regular basis. Most of the presenters at SBL don't do this well.

So, why is this necessary? I think it is a result of an unfortunate ethos at SBL. Namely an ethos of oneupmanship. Some members in the audience are like vultures ready to go in for the kill on the slightest mistake of the presenter. Therefore, to avoid any opportunity for the vultures, presenters carefully prepare their manuscripts and fill them with jargon and definitions to avoid being taken to task by members of the audience. Yet, is this the best way to move scholarship forward? I am not sure that there is an easy answer.

I do not see the ethos at SBL changing any time soon. Perhaps the answer is to take a page out of the ancient rhetorical handbooks. First, stylistically, do not fill your papers with jargon, learn to communicate with "normal" words. Second, perhaps a little practice with the rhetorical tasks of memory and delivery might be of help. Trying to memorize a paper full of jargon will immediately signal the presenter that he or she should work some more on the manuscript, to learn to communicate their ideas in a more rhetorically effective manner.

Friday, November 19, 2010

The Friday Figure

This week's Friday Figure comes from Matthew's Sermon on the Mount:
Matt. 6:34 μὴ οὖν μεριμνήσητε εἰς τὴν αὔριον, ἡ γὰρ αὔριον μεριμνήσει ἑαυτῆς·
me oun merimnesate eis ten aurion, e gar aurion merimnesei eautes
Therefore, do not worry about tomorrow, for tomorrow will worry about itself. 
This is a great example of the figure chiasm in which the word order of two words in one clause are reversed in the second clause.  In this example, the words μεριμνήσητε (worry) and αὔριον (tomorrow) are reversed in the second clause to bring a nice balance and ornament to this saying of Jesus.

Thursday, November 11, 2010

The μῦθος or Fable

The first of the progymnasmata, or preliminary exercises is the fable, or μῦθος in Greek, from which we get the word myth.  The word itself is polysemous, but one basic definition is story. 

Theon defines fable as “a fictional story which images the truth (Μῦθός ἐστι λόγος ψευδὴς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν).” The definition is fairly simple, but like the chreia, the fable can be expanded or contracted, inflected, confirmed, refuted, and woven into a narrative.

Given this basic definition of the exercise of fable, it seems to me that the parables of Jesus fit nicely into this category.  If that is the case, then perhaps we can find insight into the composition of such stories from the progymnasmata.  

A couple of notes.  First, one of the things that you can do with a fable is inflect your main subject in varying cases.  I have given an example of this here as I discussed the Parable of the Prodigal Son.  In that parable, the term father is inflected in all five cases, clearly distinguishing the father as the focus of the parable. 

Another interesting aspect of this preliminary exercise is the practice of adding a summary statement that sums up the theme of the parable. Theon writes,
"It is possible to provide a conclusion whenever, after the fable has been stated, we venture to bring in some gnomic statement fitting it... There can be several conclusions (epilogoi) for one fable when we take a start from the contents of the fable, and conversely one conclusion when many fables reflect it." (Theon, 75, Kennedy). 
Several of Jesus' parables get such a concluding "gnomic" statement or maxim.  An interesting example would be the parable of the unjust steward in Luke 16.  After the parable, Jesus rattles off several maxims that capture the theme of the parable.  Jesus says:
And I tell you, make friends for yourselves by means of dishonest wealth so that when it is gone, they may welcome you into the eternal homes.
Whoever is faithful in a very little is faithful also in much; and whoever is dishonest in a very little is dishonest also in much.
If then you have not been faithful with the dishonest wealth, who will entrust to you the true riches?
And if you have not been faithful with what belongs to another, who will give you what is your own?
No slave can serve two masters; for a slave will either hate the one and love the other, or be devoted to the one and despise the other.
You cannot serve God and wealth.
All six of these gnomic sayings are used to summarize and interpret the parable of the unjust steward.  The most interesting of these comments to me are the last two.  All of the rest of the comments are found in Luke alone.  The last two about serving two masters is a parallel with Matthew and the wording is nearly verbatim.  Now, depending on which source theory you are working with, Luke has taken this saying either from Q or from Matthew and placed it with his special L material in this place. Which of these options makes the most sense? 

Tuesday, November 9, 2010

Barbarisms

I received an email the other day with a list of "actual" GED questions and the "actual" answers given.  Whether or not these were real GED questions and answers does not concern me.  What I did find interesting though is that what made these so funny was that almost every answer had misused or mis-characterized a word.  In rhetoric this is a stylistic vice called a barbarism.  It often had to do with using foreign words in an incorrect manner, really, any misuse of a word would qualify as a barbarism

Here are some of my favorite examples from the GED questions:

Q. What happens to a boy when he reaches puberty?
A. He says goodbye to his boyhood and looks forward to his adultery
Q. What is the most common form of birth control?
A. Most people prevent contraception by wearing a condominium.
Q. What does the word 'benign' mean?
A. Benign is what you will be after you be eight.
Q. What is a turbine?
A. Something an Arab or Shreik wears on his head.
Q. Explain one of the processes by which water can be made safe to drink.
A. Flirtation makes water safe to drink because it removes large pollutants like grit, sand, dead sheep and canoeists.

Monday, November 8, 2010

Rhetoric for Sundays

I have often wondered at the effectiveness of the little messages that are posted on church marquees (as I have often wondered about the effectiveness of Christian bumper stickers).  Has anyone ever wandered into a church because of some profound message on a marquee?  Nevertheless, I do enjoy the comic factor of these messages, often mis-communicating what is trying to be said.

Take this one, for example, that my wife pointed out to me yesterday as we drove to church:


Playing off of the metaphor in Mark 1:17, this sign tries to get cute with its message.  This metaphor made sense in its original contexts as Jesus was calling his disciples who were actually fishermen.  In fact, in the original context, this was actually a nice use of both metaphor and epanodos in which a word (fisherman, ἁλιεῖς, halieis), is used with a slightly different meaning in Mark 1:16 and Mark 1:17.  Yet, this sign illustrates how a metaphor can be taken too literally and too far.  The metaphor works in Mark because it is a play on words and is not carried too far.  Yet, here, the context is actually gruesome.  The sign has tried to play on words, "he'll clean them" as in, he will make them clean.  But in the context of the metaphor, cleaning a fish is far from what Christians ought to be communicating with regard to the work of Jesus in the life of a believer.

Friday, November 5, 2010

The Friday Figure

This week's Friday Figure is a slight deviation from my norm.  I am foregoing my biblical figure this week and posting a video from the film "V for Vendetta."  The movie, which centers on a Guy Fawkes figure, seemed apropos to post today since today is Guy Fawkes day in commemoration of the day that Guy Fawkes tried to blow up parliament in 1606.  The clip contains one of the more masterful examples of the figure of speech alitteration.  Enjoy!



HT to Peter Pope at Magnificent Vista for drawing my attention again to this video.

Saturday, October 30, 2010

The Power of Words

HT to figaro at figarospeech.com for posting this video in which British comedian Stephen Fry comments on love of language.  Of course, it is all about rhetoric.  Fry comments on how to enjoy language, to use words to delight.  He derides the grammar police and notes the fluidity of language.  I have commented before that rhetoric is a morally neutral art, not inherently evil as some claim.  And I ask, to those who would deny the use of rhetoric in the New Testament: why would the biblical authors not want to use language to the best of their ability in order to persuade their audiences of the truth and importance of their message?  Enjoy the video!

Friday, October 29, 2010

The Friday Figure

This week's Friday Figure comes from the Gospel of Mark.

In Mark 8 there is an interesting, if not perplexing interchange between Jesus and his disciples. 

The Narrator sets the scene as follows:

Mark 8:14 Καὶ ἐπελάθοντο λαβεῖν ἄρτους καὶ εἰ μὴ ἕνα ἄρτον οὐκ εἶχον μεθ᾿ ἑαυτῶν ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ.
And the disciples forgot to bring any bread with them except for one bread which they had with them in the boat. 
 This is an interesting sentence. I have translated the second term as bread, whereas it is usually translated as loaf, because in Greek the word is the same, and it is precisely this play on words that forms the figure of speech. The question, did they have any bread or not?  It appears from just this sentence that they had bread.  Yet, if one skips down in the exchange, the disciples discuss among themselves, and say "it is because we have no bread."  Now it seems like the disciples do not have bread at all. 

In the context of Mark, this passage about bread and yeast is the last of several stories that have to do with bread.  Jesus feeds the five thousand Jews with five loaves of bread and two fish, and he takes up twelve baskets of leftovers.  Jesus has an interchange about bread with a syrophoenecian woman.  Then he feeds four thousand gentiles with seven loaves and a few fish and takes up seven baskets of leftovers.  If one looks at these stories for their greater symbolism, Jesus is seen as the one who feeds the Jews and takes up twelve baskets from them, a number of completeness for the Jews.  Then he feeds the Gentiles and takes up seven baskets, a number of completeness for the Gentiles.  Jesus feeds the complete number of Jews and the complete number of Gentiles.  Jesus is the bread.  So, what is the one loaf that the disciples have in the boat?  It is Jesus.  Curiously, the term bread will not be used again in Mark until the last supper where Jesus says that bread is his body.  Therefore, there are a couple of figures of speech going on here.  The first is a play on words.  The second use of bread in 8:14 is referring to Jesus.  This is an example of paronomasia: using the same word in different ways.  This is also a use of the trope metaphor, in which Jesus is described as bread.

Thursday, October 28, 2010

Figures of Speech according to the Rhetorica ad Herennium

The following is my summary of the list of Figures of Speech and Figures of Thought in Ps-Cicero's Rhetorica ad Herennium.

Figures of Speech:

Epanaphora (Repetitio): Same words begin successive phrases:
    i.e., “Scipio razed Numantia, Scipio destroyed Carthage, Scipio brought peace, Scipio saved the state.” More examples (ad Her. IV.xiii.19).

Antistrophe (Conversio): repetition of the same word as the last word in successive phrases: Similar to epanaphora (repetitio).
    i.e., “Since that time when from our state concord disappeared, liberty disappeared, good faith disappeared, friendship disappeared, the common weal disappeared.” And more examples (IV.xiii.19).

Interlacement (Conplexio): The combined use of Antistrophe and Epanaphora: repeating both the first and the last words in a clause or phrase.
    i.e., “One whom the Senate has condemned, one whom the Roman people has condemned, one whom universal public opinion has condemned.” (IV.xiv.20).

Transplacement (Traductio): The repetition of certain words without offense to style. Also, the same type of figure is used when using a word with the same spelling in different ways.
    i.e., “One who has nothing in life more desirable than life cannot cultivate a virtuous life.” (IV.xiv.20).
    i.e., “I would leave this place, should the senate grant me leave.” (IV.xiv.21).

Antithesis (Contentio): Style is built upon contraries, using contrary thoughts in successive clauses.
    i.e., “When all is calm, you are confused; when all is in confusion, you are calm.” (IV.xv.21).

Apostrophe (Exclamatio): A figure claiming indignation or grief by means of an address to an individual.
    i.e., “Perfidious Fregellae, how quickly, because of your crime, you have wasted away.” (IV.xv.22).

Interrogation (Interrogatio, Rhetorical Question, ἐρωτῆμα): Asking questions to reinforce an argument.
    i.e., “So when you were doing and saying and managing all this, were you, or were you not, alienating and estranging from the republic the sentiments of our allies.” (IV.xv.22).

Reasoning by question and answer (Ratiocinatio): Asking the reason for every statement made and giving the answer.
    i.e., “It is a good principle which our ancestors established, of not putting to death any king captured by force of arms. Why is this so? Because it were unfair to use the advantage vouchsafed to us by fortune to punish those whom the same fortune had but recently placed in the highest station…” and more examples (IV.xvi.23).

Maxim (Sententia): a saying drawn from life which shows concisely either what happens or ought to happen in life.
    i.e., “Every beginning is difficult.” And “A free man is that man to be judged who is a slave to no base habit.” (IV.xvii.24). You can also have double maxims, and maxims with reasons given for the course of action suggested.

Reasoning by Contraries (Contrarium): the figure where two opposing statements, one if which is used to directly prove the other.
    i.e., “Now how should you expect one who has ever been hostile to his own interests to be friendly to another’s.” And, “Now why should you think that one who is, as you have learned, a faithless friend, can be an honorable enemy.” (IV.xviii.25).

Colon or Clause (Membrum): The name given to the sentence member, brief and complete, which does not express an entire thought, but is in turn supplemented by another colon as follows.
    i.e., “On the one hand you were helping the enemy,” which should be supplemented by another colon: “And on the other you were hurting your friend.” (IV.xix.26).

Comma or Phrase (Articulus): When single words are set apart by pauses in staccato speech.
    i.e., By your vigor, voice, looks, you have terrified your adversaries.” And again, “you have destroyed your enemies by jealousy, injuries, influence, perfidy.” (IV.xix.26).

Period (Continuatio): a close packed and uninterrupted group of words expressing a complete thought. Best used in three places:
    Maxim: i.e., “Fortune cannot much harm him who has built his support more firmly upon virtue than upon chance.”
    Contrast: i.e., “For if a person has not placed much hope in chance, what great harm can chance do him.”
    Conclusion: i.e., “But if fortune has her greatest power over those who have committed all their plans to chance, we should not entrust our all with her, lest she gain too great a domination over us.” (IV.xix.27).

Isocolon (Conpar): figure comprised of cola (see colon above) which consist of virtually equal number of syllables.
    i.e., “the father was meeting death in battle; the son was planning a marriage at home. These omens wrought grievous disasters.” “In proelio mortem parens oppetebat, domi filius nuptias conparabat; haec omina gravis casus administrabant.” (IV.xx.27).

Homoeoptoton (Similiter Cadens): this figure occurs when in the same period two or more words appear in the same case with like terminations.
    i.e., “Hominem laudem egentem virtutis, abundantem felicitatis.” And again, “huic omnis in pecunia speas est, a sapientia est animus remotus; diligentia conparat divitas, neglegentia corrumpit animum. Et tamen, cum ita vivit, neminem prae se ducit hominem.” (IV.xx.28).

Homoteleuton (Similiter Desinens): This figure occurs when the endings of the words are similar, although the words are indeclinable.
    i.e., “You dare to act dishonorably, you strive to talk despicably, you live hatefully, you sin zealously, you speak offensively.” “Turpiter audes facere, nequiter studes dicere, vivis invidiose, delinquis studiose, loqueris odiose.” (IV.xx.28).

Paronomasia (Adnominatio): The figure where by modification of sound or a change in letters, there is a close resemblance between verb or noun, so that similar words mean dissimilar things.
    i.e., “Hic qui se magnifice iactat atque ostentat, venīt (veneo: to be sold (as a slave)) antequem Romam venĭt (venio: to come).”
    The author calls these word plays. It can also occur when the words are not quite so close: i.e., “qui sim, quem insimulem, cui prosim.”
    A third type consists of inflecting the same word in different cases, i.e.,  “Alexander [nominative] Macedo summo labore animum ad virtutem a pueritia confirmavit. Alexandri [genitive] virtutes per orbem terrae cum laude et Gloria vulgate sunt. Alexandrum [accusative] omnes maxime metuerunt, idem plurumum dilexerunt. Alexandro [dative] si vita data longior esset, trans Oceanum macedonum transvolassent sarisae.” (IV.xxi.29-xxiii.32).

Hypophora (Subiectio): asking questions of adversaries, or of oneself, and answering with what ought or ought not to be said, making yourself look good, and the adversary look bad. Reasoning by question and answer (IV.xxiv.33-34)

Climax (Gradatio): the figure in which a speaker passes to the next word only after advancing by steps to the preceding one.
    i.e., “Now what remnant of liberty survives if those men may do what they please, if they can do what they may, if they dare do what they can, if they do what they dare, and if you approve of what they do.” And again, “The industry of Africanus brought him excellence, his excellence glory, his glory rivals.” (IV.xxv.34).

Definition (Definitio): a brief, clear cut designation of the characteristic qualities of a thing.
    i.e., “The sovereign majesty of the republic is that which comprises the dignity and grandeur of the state.” (IV.xxv.35).

Transition (Transitio): the name given to the figure which briefly recalls what has been said, and likewise sets forth what is to follow.
    i.e., “My benefactions to the defendant you know; now learn how he has requited me.” (IV.xxvi.35).

Correction (Correctio): retracts what has been said and replaces it with what seems more suitable.
    i.e., “After the men in question had conquered, or rather had been conquered—for how shall I call that a conquest which has brought more disaster than benefit to the conquerors.” (IV.xxvi.36).

Paralipsis (Occultatio): when we say that we are passing by, or do not know, or refuse to say that which precisely now we are saying.
    i.e., “I do not mention that you have taken monies from our allies; I do not concern myself with your having despoiled the cities, kingdoms, and homes of them all. I pass by your thieveries and robberies, all of them.” (IV.xxvii.37).

Disjunction (Disiunctum)
: is used when each of two or more clauses ends with a special verb.
    i.e., “With disease physical beauty fades (deflorescit), with age it dies (extinguitur).” (IV.xxvii.37).

Conjunction (Coniunctio): occurs when both of the previous and succeeding phrases are held together by placing the verb between them.
    i.e., “Either with disease physical beauty fades, or with age. (Formae dignitas aut morbo deflorescit aut vetustate.”  (IV.xxvii.38).

Adjunction (Adiunctio): when the verb holding the sentence together is placed not in the middle, but at the beginning or end.
    i.e., (beginning): Fades physical beauty with disease or age.” (end) “Either with disease or age physical beauty fades.” (IV.xxvii.38).

Reduplication (Conduplicatio): the repetition of one or more words for the purpose of amplification or appeal to pity.
    i.e., “You are promoting riots, Gaius Gracchus, yes, civil and internal riots.” (IV.xviii.38).

Synonymy (Interpretatio): not duplicating the same word, but substituting another with the same meaning.
    i.e., “You have overturned (evertisti) the republic from its roots (radicitus); you have demolished (deiecisti) the state from its foundations (funditus).” (IV.xviii.38-39).


Reciprocal Change (Commutatio)
: when two discrepant thoughts are so expressed by transposition that the latter follows from the former although contradictory to it.
    i.e., “you must eat to live, not live to eat.” And “I do not write poems, because I cannot write the sort I wish, and I do not wish to write the sort I can.” (IV.xviii.39).

Surrender (Permissio): when we indicate in speaking that we yield and submit the whole matter to another’s will. This figure helps in producing pity.
    i.e., “Since only soul and body remain to me, now that I am deprived of everything else, even these, which alone of many goods are left to me, I deliver up to your power. You may use and even abuse me in your own way as you think best; with impunity make your decision upon me, whatever it may be.” (IV.xxix.39).

Indecision (Dubitatio): occurs when the speaker seems to ask with of two or more words he had better use.
    i.e., “At that time the republic suffered exceedingly from—ought I to say—the folly of the consuls, or their wickedness, or both.” (IV.xxix.40).

Elimination (Expeditio): occurs when we have enumerated the several ways by with something could have been brought about, and all are discarded except the one on which we are insisting.
    i.e., “Since it is established that the estate you claim as yours was mine, you must show that you took possession of it as vacant land, or made it your property by right of prescription, or bought it, or that it came to you by inheritance. Since I was on the premises, you could not have taken possession of it as vacant land. Even by now you cannot have made it you property by right of prescription. No sale is disclosed. Since I am alive, my property could not have come to you by inheritance. It remains then, that you have expelled my be force of estate.” (IV.xxix.40-41).

Asyndeton (Dissolutum): presentation in separate parts, conjunctions being suppressed.
    i.e., Indulge your father, obey your relatives, gratify your friends, submit to the laws (Gere morem parenti, pare cognates, obsequere amicis, obtempera legibus).” (IV.xxx.41).

Aposiopesis (Preacisio): occurs when something is said and then the rest of what the speaker had begun to say is left unfinished. The suspicion expressed is more telling than the narration of the information itself.
    i.e., “You dare to say that, who recently at another’s home—I shouldn’t dare tell, lest in saying things becoming to you, I should seem to say something unbecoming to me.” (IV.xxx.41).

Conclusion (Conclusio): by means of a brief argument, deduces the necessary consequences of what has been said or done before.
    i.e., “But if the oracle had predicted to the Danaans that Troy could not be taken without the arrows of Philoctetes, and these arrows moreover served only to smite Alexander, then certainly killing Alexander was the same as taking Troy.” (IV.xxx.41)

Ten figures of diction (called Tropes in Quintilian):

    These are kept together because they have this in common, that the language departs from the ordinary meaning of words, and is, with a certain grace, applied in another sense. (IV.xxxi.42).

Onomatopoeia (Nominatio): suggests to us that we should ourselves designate with a suitable word, whether for the sake of imitation or of expressiveness, a thing which either lacks a name or has an inappropriate name.
    i.e., (imitation) “Our ancestors, for example, said ‘roar (rudere),’ ‘bellow (mugire),’ ‘murmur (murmurari),’ ‘hiss (sibilare).’” (expressiveness) “After this creature attacked the republic, there was a hullabaloo (fragor) among the first men of the state.” (IV.xxxi.42).

Autonomasia (Pronominatio): designates by an accidental epithet a thing that cannot be called by its proper name.
    i.e., “if some one speaking of the Gracchi should say, ‘Surely the grandsons of Africanus did not behave like this.’” (IV.xxxi.42).

Metonymy (Denominatio): draws from an object closely akin or associated, an expression suggesting the object meant, but not called by its own name. This is accomplished in several ways.
    i.e., 1) using the greater for the lesser, “speaking of the Tarpeian Rock and calling it ‘the Capitoline’.” 2) Using the name of the thing invented for that of the inventor, “wine” for “Liber” or “wheat” for “Ceres.” 3) using the name of the instrument for the possessor, i.e., “as if one should refer to the Macedonians as follows: ‘Not so quickly did the Lances (Macedonians) get possession of Greece.” 4) Using the cause for the effect, as in referring to someone doing something in war might say, “Mars forced you to do that.” And several other examples: effect for cause, container for content, content for container. (IV.xxxii.43).

Periphrasis (Circumitio): a manner of speech used to express a simple idea by means of circumlocution.
    i.e., “The foresight of Scipio crushed the power of Carthage,” instead of just saying, “Scipio crushed Carthage.” (IV.xxxii.43).

Hyperbaton (Transgressio): upsets the normal word order by means of Anastrophe or Transposition.
    i.e., (Anastrophe) “hoc vobis deos immortales arbitror dedisse virtute pro vestra (I think the immortal gods have given this to you on account of your virtue.” (Transposition) “Instabilis in istum plurimum fortuna valuit. Omnes invidiose eripuit bene vivendi casus facultates (Unstable fortune has exercised her greatest power on this creature. All the means of living well chance has jealously taken from him. (IV.xxxii.44).

Hyperbole (Superlatio): exaggerating the truth, whether for the sake of magnifying or minimizing something. This is used independently or with comparison.
    i.e., (Independently) “But if we maintain concord in the state, we shall measure the empire’s vastness by the rising and the setting of the sun.” (with comparison from equivalence) “his body was as white as snow, his face burned like fire.” (with comparison from superiority) “From his mouth flowed speech sweeter than honey.” (IV.xxxiii.44).

Synechdoche (Intellectio): occurs when the whole is known from the part, or the part from the whole.
    i.e., “Were not those nuptial flutes reminding you of his wedding (i.e., the flutes for the whole marriage).” Look also for the singular from the plural and vice versa. (IV.xxxiii.44).

Catachresis (Abusio): the inexact use of a like and kindred word in place of the precise and proper one.
    i.e., “the power of the man is short,” “small height,” “The long wisdom in the man,” “a mighty speech.” (IV.xxxii.45).

Metaphor (Translatio): when a word applying to one thing is transferred to another, because the similarity seems to justify the transference.
    i.e., “The recent arrival of an army suddenly blotted out the state.” (IV.xxiv.45).

Allegory (Permutatio): is the figure of speech denoting one thing by the letter of the words, but another by their meaning.
    i.e., (comparison) “For when dogs act the part of wolves, to what guardian, pray, are we going to entrust our cattle.” (Argument) referring to Drusus as a “faded reflection of the Gracchi.” (Contrast) “if, for example, one should mockingly call a spendthrift and voluptuary frugal and thrifty.” (IV.xxxiv.46).

Figures of Thought:

Distribution (Distributio): occurs when certain specified roles are assigned among a number of things or persons.
    i.e., “The Senate’s function is to assist the state with counsel; the magistracy’s is to execute, by diligent activity, the Senate’s will; the people’s to chose and support it by its votes the best measures and the most suitable men.” (IV.xxxv.47).

Frankness of Speech (Licentia, παρῆσσια)
: when talking before those to whom we owe reverence or fear, we yet exercise our right to speak out because we seem justified in reprehending them, or persons dear to them, for some fault. One my follow Licentia up with praise to mollify the hearers, or use feigned Licentia, using pretence of Frank Speech to gain the support of the audience.
    i.e., “You wonder, fellow citizens, that every one abandons your interests? That no one undertakes your cause? Blame this on yourselves; cease to wonder…&c.” (IV.xxxvi.48).

Understatement (Deminutio) (Often called Litotes): occurs when we say that by nature, fortune, or diligence, we or our clients possess some exceptional advantage, and, in order to avoid the impression of arrogant display, we moderate and soften the statement of it.
    i.e., “This, men of the jury, I have the right to say—that by our labor and diligence I have contrived to be no laggard in the mastery of military science.” (use of “no laggard” instead of saying that he was “the best.”) (IV.xxxviii.50).

Vivid Description (Descriptio): contains a clear, lucid, and impressive exposition of the consequences of an act.
    i.e., “But, men of the jury, if by your votes you free this defendant, immediately, like a lion released from his cage, or some foul beast loosed from his chains, he will slink and prowl about in the forum, sharpening his teeth to attack everyone’s property … &c.” (IV.xxxix.51).

Division (Divisio): separates the alternatives of a question and resolves each by means of a reason adjoined.
    i.e., “Why should I now reproach you in any way? If you are an upright man, you have not deserved reproach; if a wicked man, you will be unmoved.” (IV.xl.52).

Accumulation (Frequentatio): occurs when the points scattered throughout the whole case are collected in one place so as to make the speech more impressive or sharp, or accusatory.
    i.e., “He is the betrayer of his own self respect, and they waylayer of the self respect of others; covetous, intemperate, irascible, arrogant; disloyal to his parents, ungrateful to his friends, troublesome to his kin; insulting to his betters, disdainful of his equals and mates, cruel to his inferiors; in short he is intolerable to everyone.” (IV.xl.52).

Refining (Expolitio): consists in dwelling on the same topic and yet seeming to say something ever new.
    i.e., “No peril is so great that a wise man would think it ought to be avoided when the safety of the fatherland is at stake. When the lasting security of the state is in question, the man endowed with good principles will undoubtedly believe that in defense of the fortunes of the republic he ought to shun no crisis of life, and he will ever persist in the determination eagerly to enter, for the fatherland, any combat, however great the peril to life.” (IV.xlii.54).

Dialogue (Sermocinatio): putting in the mouth of some person language in keeping with his character (c.f., Prosopopoeia Theon Progymnasmata).
    i.e., “The wise man will think that for the common weal he ought to undergo every peril. Often he will say to himself ‘Not for self alone was I born, but also, and much more, for the fatherland. Above all, let me spend my life, which I owe to fate, for the salvation of my country.’” (IV.xlii.55).

Dwelling on the Point (Commoratio): occurs when one remains rather long upon, and often returns to, the strongest topic in which the whole cause rests.
    i.e., no example is given because this figure consists of arguments throughout the whole of any larger work. (IV.xlv.58).


Antithesis (Contentio): is when contraries meet. This is either a figure of speech as shown above, or as here, a figure of thought.
    i.e., “While you deplore the troubles besetting him, this knave rejoices in the ruin of the state.” (IV.xlv.58).

Comparison (Similitudo): is a manner of speech that caries over an element of likeness from one thing to a different thing. This is used to embellish or prove or clarify or vivify. It also has four forms: contrast, negation, detailed parallel, and abridged comparison. The author lists several examples from each of the four forms, and for each of the four purposes.
    i.e., in negation: “Neither can an untrained horse, however well built by nature, be fit for the services desired of a horse, nor can an uncultivated man, however well endowed by nature, attain to virtue.” (IV.xlv.59-xlviii.61).

Exemplification (Exemplum): is the citing of something done or said in the past, along with the definite naming of the doer or author.
    i.e., likewise, no example is given for this. He states that he has given the nature of this form in his discussion of refining, and the motives for this figure under comparison. (IV.xlix.62).

Simile (Imago): is the comparison of one figure with another, implying a certain resemblance between them. This is used either for praise or censure.
    i.e., for praise, “He entered the combat in body like the strongest bull, in impetuosity like the fiercest lion.” (IV.xlix.62).

Portrayal (Effictio): representing and depicting in words clearly enough for recognition the bodily form of some person.
    i.e., “I mean him, men of the jury, the ruddy, short, bent man, with white and rather curly hair, blue-grey eyes, and a huge scar on his chin, if perhaps you can recall him to memory” (IV.xlix. 63).

Character Delineation (Notatio): describing a persons character by the definite signs which, like distinctive marks, are attributes of that character.
    The author then gives a rather lengthy story of a man who parades around as if he were rich, but is actually poor. Throughout, by telling a story of this mans words and deeds, he describes his character with remarkable clarity. Further, the author writes, “Character delineations of this kind which describe the qualities proper to each man’s nature carry very great charm, for they set before our eyes a person’s whole character, of the boastful man, as I undertook to illustrate, for the envious or pompous man, or the miser, the climber, the lover, the voluptuary, the thief, the public informer—in short, by such delineation any one’s ruling passion can be brought into the open (IV.l.63-li.65).

Dialogue (Sermocinatio): consists in assigning to some person language which as set forth conforms with his character (c.f., prosopopoeia, Theon Progymnasmata).
    The author then gives a lengthy story of a soldier who appears at a wealthy home and demands to see the master. He threatens the master, but the master of the house will not submit himself and is thus killed. There are several characters in this story, each playing a different role, and showing by their words, their character (IV.lii.65).This seems similar to Aristotle’s view that characters in fiction speak in “universals,” that is, speaking as one would in a given situation according to what is necessary and probable.

Personification (Conformatio)
: consists in representing an absent person as present, or in making a mute thing, or one lacking form articulate, and attributing to it a definite form and a language or certain behavior appropriate to its character.
    i.e., “But if that great Lucius Brutus should now come to life again and appear here before you, would he not use this language?  ‘I banished kings; you bring in tyrants. I created liberty, which did not exist; which I created you do not wish to preserve…” (IV.liii.66).

Emphasis (Significatio): leaves more to be suspected than has actually been asserted. It is produced through hyperbole, ambiguity, logical consequence, aposiopesis, and analogy. This figure sometimes possesses liveliness and distinction in the highest degree; indeed it permits the hearer himself to guess what the speaker has not mentioned.
    i.e., through hyperbole, “Out of so great a patrimony, in so short a time, this man has not laid by even an earthen pitcher wherewith to seek a fire for himself.”
    i.e., through aposiopesis, “he who so handsome and so young, recently at a stranger’s house—I am unwilling to say more.” (IV.liii.67-liv.67).

Conciseness (Brevitas): expressing an idea in the very minimum of essential words.
    i.e., “on his way he took Lemnus, then left a garrison at Thasus, after that he destroyed the Bithynian city, Cius; next, returning to the Hellespont, he forthwith occupies Abydus.”  (IV.liv.68).

Ocular Demonstration (Demonstratio): when an event is so described in words that the business seems to be enacted and the subject to pass vividly before our eyes.
    i.e., “In a sweat, with his eyes blazing, hair bristling, toga awry, he begins to quicken his pace…but this fellow, frothing crime from his mouth, breathing forth cruelty from the depth of his lungs.” (IV.lv.68).

Wednesday, October 27, 2010

Figures of Speech: Galen Rowe

The following is my summary of a list of figures of speech from Galen Rowe.

Galen O. Rowe, “Style” in Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period: 330 B.C. – A.D. 400, (Edited by Stanley Porter, Leiden: Brill, 2001), 121-158.

  1. Tropes (extend, expand, or change meaning of words)
    1. Metaphor
    2. Metonymy: name of one thing applied to another with which it is closely associated
    3. Synechdoche: Part signified by the whole, or the whole by the part
    4. Emphasis: special or greater meaning than the word itself signifies
    5. Periphrasis: saying in many words what might be said in few, or roundabout what might be said directly
    6. Autonomasia: substitution of an appellative, usually a nickname or epithet, for a proper name
    7. Hyperbole: a fitting exaggeration of the truth in order to make a point
    8. Litotes: emphatic affirmation be denying the opposite
    9. Irony: use of words which in the context convey a contrary meaning
  2. Word Figures
    1. Epanalepsis: repetition of a word or group of words within the same clause
    2. Anadiplosis: repetition of a word which ends a clause at the beginning of the next clause
    3. Climax: ascending order of thought through successive clauses, last word of preceding clause repeated as the first word in next phrase
    4. Prosapodosis: use of the same word or group of words at the beginning and at the end of a clause or sentence
    5. Anaphora: when successive clauses begin with the same word or group of words
    6. Antistrophe: the repetition of the same word at the end of successive clauses
    7. Symploche: repetition of the same beginning and ending words in a succession of clauses
    8. Paronomasia: a pun, a play on words which sound nearly the same but have distinctively different meanings
    9. Traductio: a play on different meanings of the same word or on different words that have the same spelling
    10. Polyptoton: repetition of a noun or pronoun in different cases at the beginnings of successive clauses
    11. Metabole: pronouns that change case and also spelling used in successive clauses
    12. Metaclisis: repeated use of the same word with different inflections elsewhere than at the beginnings of successive clauses
    13. Synonymia: repetition of a thought in synonymous terms
    14. Diaphora: repeated use of the same word, which acquires added or different significance in the repetition
    15. Diairesis: specified roles are assigned among several parts of a whole or several members of a group
    16. Epitheton: attributive addition to a substantive, such as an adjective or appositive
    17. Polysyndeton: repeated use of conjunctions
    18. Ellipsis: the omission of essential grammatical details
    19. Zeugma: use of a word in one phrase which must be supplied in other parallel phrases in order to complete the meaning
    20. Asyndeton: omission of conjunctions
    21. Anastrophe: reversal of the normal sequence of two words that immediately follow one another
    22. Hyperbaton: separation of two words that syntactically belong together through the insertion of a word or group of words
    23. Synchesis: an elaborate form of hyperbaton, forms of one syntactic group separated by words from another syntactic group
    24. Isocolon: two or more coordinate clauses which tend to have the same construction and length (in syllables)
    25. Chiasmus: feature of isocolon where the second clause reverses the order of the first
    26. Homoeoteleuton: feature of isocolon in which coordinate clauses end in words that have the same inflections and sounds
    27. Homoeoptoton: frequent repetition of the same grammatical case within one period or sentence
  3. Thought Figures
    1. Deesis: an impassioned request in the name of a god or a special sacred object
    2. Parrhesia: claiming to use candor, which by appearing to risk the good will of the audience, is intended to acquire their respect for the courage of the speaker
    3. Apostrophe: turning from the general audience to address a specific person or group
    4. Erotesis: an affirmative proposition stated in the form of a question to which the answer is obvious
    5. Pusma: question which demands an answer other than yes or no
    6. Aitiologia: imaginary dialogue in the form of question and answer
    7. Aporia: state of feigned helplessness in which the speaker seeks advice as to how to proceed
    8. Anacoeosis: feigned helplessness in which the speaker asks advice not about speech but about action
    9. Orismus: a definition which supports the speaker’s case but is not therefore contrary to common opinion
    10. Epanorthosis: correction or improvement of a remark immediately recognized by the speaker as unsuitable
    11. Prodiorthosis: attempt to prepare the audience for a shocking or offensive statement
    12. Antithesis: juxtaposition of opposite meanings
    13. Prosapodosis: a statement about two or more elements which are elaborated in separate distinguishing clauses
    14. Antimetabole: the confrontation of a thought and its reverse through the repetition of the same words with switched grammatical functions
    15. Oxymoron: paradoxical statement combining two terms, which in ordinary usage are contraries
    16. Exclamatio: abrupt utterance, usually isolated in context by grammar and vocal stress and conveying a strong emotion, such as pity or indignation
    17. Enargeia: description of a situation or action as if it were present
    18. Sermocinatio: creation of statements, conversations, soliloquies or unexpressed thoughts attributed to normal persons, real or imagined
    19. Prosopopoiia: attribution of speech and personality to non-human things
    20. Epimone: repetition of a thought either in the same words but with changed vocal inflection or in synonyms, which while conveying the same basic meaning, nevertheless adds nuance to it.
    21. Simile: explicit comparison between the speaker’s subject and a fact of natural life and fixed human experience
    22. Metabasis: abrupt change of subject or the return to a subject from a digression
    23. Syneociosis: exploitation of an opponents argument to one’s own advantage
    24. Proparaskeue: the speaker prepares the audience to attend in a special way to the course of argument about to come
    25. Synchoresis: admission of truth of an opponents argument which is shown to have no damaging effect on one’s case
    26. Epitrope: speaker pretends to allow, even to dater, someone to decide or act independently or contrary to the speaker’s position
    27. Parenthesis: insertion of a grammatically independent clause within a sentence
    28. Aetiologia: attachment of a reason to a main statement
    29. Gnome: truism or maxim
    30. Epiphonema: statement, often in the form of an exclamation, that concludes a line of argument or makes a comment about what has been narrated
    31. Epitrochasmus: brief enumeration of subjects, events, each of which would otherwise deserve a prolonged treatment. (As like an outline)
    32. Paraleipsis: the speaker’s stated intention to omit certain subjects which he nevertheless mentions in passing
    33. Aposiopesis: abrupt breaking off of thought before it has been completely expressed
    34. Hysterologia: what should logically be said first is last, and vice versa

Tuesday, October 26, 2010

Introduction to Figures of Speech in the Gospel of Luke

Figures of Speech in the Gospel of Luke

  • I.    What are Figures of Speech? (Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 8.6-9.3; Pseudo Cicero, Rhetorica ad Herennium, 4.10-4.55). 
    • A.    Any artful, uncommon use of language.
      • 1.    Tropes: “the artistic alteration of a word or phrase from its proper meaning to another” (Quintilian, Inst. 8.6.1).
        • a.    Metaphor: “Go tell that fox,” (Luke 13:32). 
        • b.    Synechdoche: Whole from the part, or part from the whole, singular from plural, plural from singular: “into the hands of men” (Luke 9:44)
      • 2.    Figures of Speech: figures of speech are the uncommon ordering of words for rhetorical ornament.
        • a.    Antithesis: “Watch therefore lest the light in you be darkness” (Luke 11:35)
        • b.    epanalepsis: repetition of a word twice in a row, “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, killer of the prophets…” (Luke 13:34)
  • 3.    Figures of Thought: the uncommon or artful ordering of thoughts.
        • a.    Brevitas: using the minimum number of words to convey a thought, “I desire, be cleansed” (Luke 5:13).
        • b.    Simile: comparison using like or as, “as sheep among wolves” (Luke 10:3).
  • II.    Examples of Figures of Speech from the Gospel of Luke
    • A.    Figures recognizable in translation
      • 1.    Epanaphora, antistrophe, interlacement: repetition of first word in two clauses, repetition of last word in two clauses, combination of epanaphora and antistrophe.
        • a.    Luke 6:21: Blessed are those who hunger now, Because you will be filled. Blessed are those who weep now, Because you will laugh.
      • 2.    Rhetorical Question
        • a.    Do you not know that it is necessary for me to be in my father’s house? (Luke 2:49)
        • b.    Why do you call me: Lord Lord, and you do not do what I say? (Luke 6:46)
        • c.    And if you love those who love you, what good is it for you? (Luke 6:32)
      • 3.    Antithesis
        • a.    Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick. (Luke 5:31)
        • b.    But I say to you that listen, Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you. (Luke 6:27)
        • c.    Whoever is not with me is against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters. (Luke 11:23)
      • 4.    Hyperbole
        • a.    Why do you see the speck in your neighbor’s eye, but do not notice the log in your own eye? (Luke 6:41) (Also Rhetorical Question)
        • b.    Fear came over all their neighbors, and all these things were talked about throughout the entire hill country of Judea. (Luke 1:65)
        • c.    Then all the people of the surrounding country of the Gerasenes asked Jesus to leave them; for they were seized with great fear. So he got into the boat and returned. (Luke 8:37)
      • 5.    Chiasm (Called reciprocal change in Rhet. Her.)
        • a.    For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will save it. (Luke 9:24)
        • b.    Indeed, some are last who will be first, and some are first who will be last. (Luke 13:30).
        • c.    For all who exalt themselves will be humbled, and those who humble themselves will be exalted. (Luke 14:11)
    • B.    Figures only recognizable in original Greek
  • 1.    Homoteleuton/Homoeoptoton: similar endings without case endings, similar endings with case endings.
        • a.    Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν δένδρον καλὸν ποιοῦν καρπὸν σαπρόν, οὐδὲ πάλιν δένδρον σαπρὸν ποιοῦν καρπὸν καλόν. (Luke 6:43)
        • b.    τυφλοὶ ἀναβλέπουσιν, χωλοὶ περιπατοῦσιν, λεπροὶ καθαρίζονται καὶ κωφοὶ ἀκούουσιν, νεκροὶ ἐγείρονται, πτωχοὶ εὐαγγελίζονται· (Luke 7:22)
        • c.    κἂν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ κἂν ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ φυλακῇ ἔλθῃ καὶ εὕρῃ οὕτως, μακάριοί εἰσιν ἐκεῖνοι. (Luke 12:38)
      • 2.    Alliteration/Assonance
        • a.    ἡ πίστις σου σέσωκέν σε. (Luke 7:50, 8:48, 17:19, 18:42)
        • b.    ὁ σπείρων τοῦ σπεῖραι τὸν σπόρον αὐτοῦ. καὶ ἐν τῷ σπείρειν αὐτὸν ὃ μὲν ἔπεσεν παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν. (Luke 8:5)
        • c.    καλέσας δὲ δέκα δούλους ἑαυτοῦ ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς δέκα… (Luke 19:13)
      • 3.    Polytptoton (under paronomasia in Rhet. Her.): inflecting the main subject in different cases.
        • a.    παλαιόν, παλαιῷ, παλαιούς, παλαιὸν, παλαιὸς (Luke 5:36-39)
        • b.    σου, σοι, σε, σε, σε, σου, σοί, σοί, σου (Luke 19:43-44)
        • c.    Inflection of πατήρ twelve times in all five cases (Luke 15:11-32).
      • 4.    Polysyndeton/Asyndeton: use of multiple conjunctions, lack of conjunctions
        • a.    καὶ ἥξουσιν ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν καὶ ἀπὸ βορρᾶ καὶ νότου καὶ ἀνακλιθήσονται ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ. (Luke 13:29)
        • b.    καὶ οὐ μισεῖ τὸν πατέρα ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τὰς ἀδελφὰς ἔτι τε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοῦ, (Luke 14:26)
        • c.    ἤσθιον, ἔπινον, ἐγάμουν, ἐγαμίζοντο, ἄχρι ἧς ἡμέρας εἰσῆλθεν Νῶε (Luke 17:27)
  • III.    Significance of Figures of Speech
    • A.    Figures of speech are like verbal caution signs; they are designed to catch the attention of the audience.
    • B.    Figures highlight what the author deems is important.
    • C.    Repeated figures, forming a certain pattern, might tell us important things about how an author wrote, what he wanted to emphasize.
    • D.    In certain cases, like the parable of the prodigal son, a figure of speech (polyptoton) might tell us what the main subject of a section is.
    • E.    Figures of speech can convey emotion: e.g., asyndeton with a quick delivery displays vigor or force.  Apostrophe, in which the speaker turns from a general audience to a specific audience might display pleasure, or anger.
    • F.    Figures of speech can simply be pleasant to listen to, making the audience more likely to be attentive.
    • G.    What other functions can you think of for figures of speech?
  • IV.    Tips on finding figures of Speech in the Gospel of Luke.
    • A.    Familiarize yourself with the figures by reading the sections in Institutio Oratoria and Rhetorica ad Herennium. See also rhetoricandthent.blogspot.com.
    • B.    Select a manageable passage.
    • C.    Read it in Greek first for understanding (you don’t want to get tripped up over grammar or vocabulary)
    • D.    Read the passage in Greek aloud, both looking for and listening for patterns.  Is there repetition of a specific word or thought? Is there rhyme? Is there a repetition of certain consonantal or vowel sounds?  
    • E.    If you think you might have a figure, then check it with the handbooks.
    • F.    Good hunting!

Friday, October 22, 2010

The Friday Figure

This week's Friday Figure comes from Paul's defense speech in Acts 24.  Much work has been done on the rhetoric of Paul's forensic speeches in Acts, but I do not know of anyone who has pointed out figures of speech.

Paul begins his speech with a nice use of adiunctio which the Rhetorica ad Herennium defines as the figure in which "the verb holding the sentence together is placed not in the middle, but at the beginning or end" (Rhet Her. 4.27.38). 

Here is Paul's opening sentence:

ἐκ πολλῶν ἐτῶν ὄντα σε κριτὴν τῷ ἔθνει τούτῳ ἐπιστάμενος εὐθύμως τὰ περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογοῦμαι

ek pollon eton onta se kriten to ethnei touto epistamenos euthumos ta peri emautou apologoumai

Luke has pushed the main verb in this sentence,  ἀπολογοῦμαι (I make a defense) all the way to the end of the sentence.  By placing the main verb at the end of the sentence, Luke keeps the listener hanging on to his words until the end of the sentence.  The NRSV loses this figure by placing the verb  near the beginning. 

A translation that would keep this figure would be as follows:

"Knowing that for many years you have been a judge over this people, cheerfully I  make my defense."

Friday, October 15, 2010

The Friday Figure

This week's Friday Figure comes from Mark.  Mark makes wonderful use of the figure chiasmus, the figure in which words from the first clause are used again but in reverse order. 

Here is the example from Mark 10
Mark 10:31 But many who are first will be last, and the last will be first.
Not surprisingly, many of Jesus' most memorable phrases are in the form of a chiasmus.  Here are some others.
Mark 8:35 For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake, and for the sake of the gospel, will save it. 
Matt. 23:12 All who exalt themselves will be humbled, and all who humble themselves will be exalted.
Can you think of any more?

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Alphabetical List of Figures of Speech

In the following, I give an alphabetical list of tropes, figures of speech, and figures of thought with examples derived from Ps-Cicero’s Rhetorica ad Herennium and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria.

The naming of figures of speech is notoriously difficult because there are many names for a given figure and each rhetorician seems to differ as to the names, but not the definitions.  For the names of the figures I have used the following rules: (1) I have used the most common or well-known name which is usually based on the Latin, e.g., alliteration/assonance rather than homoeophrophoron. (2) If no well-known name is used, I have used the Greek name. (3) If no well-known or Greek name is used, I have used the Latin name. Examples are from the Rhetorica ad Herennium unless figure only occurs in Quintilian or elsewhere.

Adiunctio (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.27.38): The figure in which the verb holding the sentence together is placed not in the middle, but at the beginning or end; e.g., (Beginning): Fades physical beauty with disease or age.” (End): “Either with disease or age physical beauty fades.” 

Allegory (Permutatio) (trope, Rhet. Her. 4.34.46; Inst. 8.6.44-53): The trope denoting one thing by the letter of the words, but another by their meaning; e.g., (Comparison): “For when dogs act the part of wolves, to what guardian, pray, are we going to entrust our cattle.” (Argument) referring to Drusus as a “faded reflection of the Gracchi.” (Contrast): “If, for example, one should mockingly call a spendthrift and voluptuary frugal and thrifty.”

Alliteration/Assonance (Homoeophrophoron) (figure of speech, Lausberg, Handbook, 432): the frequent repetition of the same consonant, chiefly the initial consonant, in a sequence of several words; e.g., “O Titus Tatius, Tyrant, what great things you have brought upon yourself (o Tite tute Tati tibi tanta tyranne tulisti).”
 
Anadiplosis (figure of speech, Inst. 9.3.44-45):  The figure in which there is a repetition of a word which ends a clause at the beginning of the next clause, e.g., “yet this man lives. Lives?” and again, “And ye, Pierian Muses, shall enhance their worth for Gallus, Gallus, he for whom each hour my love burns stronger.”

Anaphora (Epanaphora, Repetitio) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.13.19; Inst. 9.3.30): The figure in which the same words begin successive phrases; e.g., “Scipio razed Numantia, Scipio destroyed Carthage, Scipio brought peace, Scipio saved the state.”

Antanaclasis (figure of speech, Inst. 9.3.68-69): The figure in which the same word is used with two different meanings.
 
Antistrophe (Conversio) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.13.19; Inst. 9.3.30-31): The figure in which there is a repetition of the same word as the last word in successive phrases: similar to anaphora; e.g., “Since that time when from our state concord disappeared, liberty disappeared, good faith disappeared, friendship disappeared, the common weal disappeared.”

Antithesis (Contentio) (figure of speech, figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.15.21; 4.45.58; Inst. 9.3.81-86): The figure in which style is built upon contraries, using contrary thoughts in successive clauses; figure of speech: e.g., “When all is calm, you are confused; when all is in confusion, you are calm.” “While you deplore the troubles besetting him, this knave rejoices in the ruin of the state.”
 
Aporia (Dubitatio) (figure of speech, figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.29.40; Inst. 9.2.19-25): The figure in which the speaker seems to ask which of two or more words he had better use; feigned hesitation, to be at a loss, to ask advice from the audience; e.g., “At that time the republic suffered exceedingly from—ought I to say—the folly of the consuls, or their wickedness, or both.”

Aposiopesis (Preacisio, Antiphrasis) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.30.41; Inst. 9.2.47-48, 9.2.54-55): The figure in which something is said and then the rest of what the speaker had begun to say is left unfinished. The suspicion expressed is more telling than the narration of the information itself; e.g., “You dare to say that, who recently at another’s home—I shouldn’t dare tell, lest in saying things becoming to you, I should seem to say something unbecoming to me.”

Apostrophe (Exclamatio) (figure of speech, figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.15.22; Inst. 9.3.23-24, 9.2.26-27, 9.2.38-39): A figure claiming indignation or grief by means of an address to an individual; e.g., “Perfidious Fregellae, how quickly, because of your crime, you have wasted away.”

Asyndeton (Dissolutio) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.30.41; Inst. 9.3.50): The figure in which there is a presentation in separate parts, conjunctions being suppressed; e.g., “Indulge your father, obey your relatives, gratify your friends, submit to the laws.” 

Autonomasia (Pronominatio) (trope, Rhet. Her. 4.31.42; Inst. 8.6.29-30): The trope in which one designates by an accidental epithet a thing that cannot be called by its proper name; e.g., “If some one speaking of the Gracchi should say, ‘Surely the grandsons of Africanus did not behave like this.’”

Brevitas (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.54.68): The figure in which one expresses an idea in the very minimum of essential words; e.g., “On his way he took Lemnus, then left a garrison at Thasus, after that he destroyed the Bithynian city, Cius; next, returning to the Hellespont, he forthwith occupies Abydus.” 
 
Catachresis (Abusio) (trope, Rhet. Her. 4.33.45): The trope in which there is the inexact use of a like and kindred word in place of the precise and proper one; e.g., “the power of the man is short,” “small height,” “the long wisdom in the man,” “a mighty speech.”
 
Chiasmus (Commutatio) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.18.39): The figure in which two discrepant thoughts are so expressed by transposition that the latter follows from the former although contradictory to it; e.g., “You must eat to live, not live to eat.” And “I do not write poems, because I cannot write the sort I wish, and I do not wish to write the sort I can.”
 
Climax (Gradatio) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.25.34; Inst. 9.3.55-57): The figure in which a speaker passes to the next word only after advancing by steps to the preceding one; e.g., “Now what remnant of liberty survives if those men may do what they please, if they can do what they may, if they dare do what they can, if they do what they dare, and if you approve of what they do.” And again, “The industry of Africanus brought him excellence, his excellence glory, his glory rivals.”

Colon or Clause (Membrum) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.19.26): The name given to the sentence member, brief and complete, which does not express an entire thought, but is in turn supplemented by another colon as follows: e.g., “On the one hand you were helping the enemy,” which should be supplemented by another colon: “And on the other you were hurting your friend.”

Comma (Articulus) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.19.26): The figure in which single words are set apart by pauses in staccato speech; e.g., “By your vigor, voice, looks, you have terrified your adversaries.” And again, “you have destroyed your enemies by jealousy, injuries, influence, perfidy.”

Commoratio (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.45.58): The figure in which one remains rather long upon, and often returns to, the strongest topic in which the whole cause rests.
 
Comparison (Similitudo) (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.45.59-4.48.61; Inst. 9.2.100-101): The figure in which there is a manner of speech that caries over an element of likeness from one thing to a different thing. This is used to embellish or prove or clarify or vivify. It also has four forms: contrast, negation, detailed parallel, and abridged comparison. The author lists several examples from each of the four forms, and for each of the four purposes; e.g., (Negation): “Neither can an untrained horse, however well built by nature, be fit for the services desired of a horse, nor can an uncultivated man, however well endowed by nature, attain to virtue.”
 
Concessio (figure of thought, Inst. 9.2.51): The figure in which one pretends to admit something actually unfavorable by way of showing confidence in one’s cause, e.g., in Cicero, speaking of the prejudice against his client, “Let it prevail in the public assembly, but be silent in the courts of law.”
 
Conclusio (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.30.41): The figure in which, by means of a brief argument, one deduces the necessary consequences of what has been said or done before; e.g., “But if the oracle had predicted to the Danaans that Troy could not be taken without the arrows of Philoctetes, and these arrows moreover served only to smite Alexander, then certainly killing Alexander was the same as taking Troy.”

Conduplicatio (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.18.38): The figure in which there is a repetition of one or more words for the purpose of amplification or appeal to pity; e.g., “You are promoting riots, Gaius Gracchus, yes, civil and internal riots.”

Confessio (figure of thought, Inst. 9.2.51): The figure in which there is a confession of a fact that in no way harms one’s case.
 
Coniunctio (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.27.38): The figure in which both the previous and succeeding phrases are held together by placing the verb between them; e.g., “Either with disease physical beauty fades, or with age. (Formae dignitas aut morbo deflorescit aut vetustate).”
 
Contrarium (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.18.25): The figure in which there are two opposing statements, one if which is used to directly prove the other; e.g., “Now how should you expect one who has ever been hostile to his own interests to be friendly to another’s.” And, “Now why should you think that one who is, as you have learned, a faithless friend, can be an honorable enemy.”
 
Correctio (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.26.36): The figure in which one retracts what has been said and replaces it with what seems more suitable; e.g., “After the men in question had conquered, or rather had been conquered—for how shall I call that a conquest which has brought more disaster than benefit to the conquerors.”

Definitio (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.25.35): The figure in which there is a brief, clear cut designation of the characteristic qualities of a thing; e.g., “The sovereign majesty of the republic is that which comprises the dignity and grandeur of the state.”

Demonstratio (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.40.68; Inst. 9.2.40-44): The figure in which an event is so described in words that the business seems to be enacted and the subject to pass vividly before our eyes; e.g., “In a sweat, with his eyes blazing, hair bristling, toga awry, he begins to quicken his pace…but this fellow, frothing crime from his mouth, breathing forth cruelty from the depth of his lungs.”

Descriptio (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.39.51): The figure which contains a clear, lucid, and impressive exposition of the consequences of an act; e.g., “But, men of the jury, if by your votes you free this defendant, immediately, like a lion released from his cage, or some foul beast loosed from his chains, he will slink and prowl about in the forum, sharpening his teeth to attack everyone’s property … &c.”

Digressio (figure of thought, Inst. 9.2.55-57): The figure in which one leaves off from the original topic for a different tangential topic.

Disiunctum (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.27.37): The figure in which each of two or more clauses ends with a special verb; e.g., “With disease physical beauty fades (deflorescit), with age it dies (extinguitur).”

Distributio (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.35.47): The figure in which certain specified roles are assigned among a number of things or persons; e.g., “The Senate’s function is to assist the state with counsel; the magistracy’s is to execute, by diligent activity, the Senate’s will; the people’s to chose and support by its votes the best measures and the most suitable men.”

Divisio (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.40.52): The figure in which one separates the alternatives of a question and resolves each by means of a reason adjoined; e.g., “Why should I now reproach you in any way? If you are an upright man, you have not deserved reproach; if a wicked man, you will be unmoved.”

Effictio (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.49.63): The figure in which one represents and depicts in words clearly enough for recognition the bodily form of some person; e.g., “I mean him, men of the jury, the ruddy, short, bent man, with white and rather curly hair, blue-grey eyes, and a huge scar on his chin, if perhaps you can recall him to memory”

Ellipsis (Detractio) (figure of thought, Inst. 9.2.37): The figure in which there is a deliberate omission of any indication of who is speaking.

Emphasis (Significatio) (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.53.67-4.54.67; Inst. 9.2.64-65): The figure in which one leaves more to be suspected than has actually been asserted. It is produced through hyperbole, ambiguity, logical consequence, aposiopesis, and analogy. This figure sometimes possesses liveliness and distinction in the highest degree; indeed it permits the hearer himself to guess what the speaker has not mentioned; e.g., (Hyperbole): “Out of so great a patrimony, in so short a time, this man has not laid by even an earthen pitcher wherewith to seek a fire for himself;” e.g., (Aposiopesis): “He who so handsome and so young, recently at a stranger’s house—I am unwilling to say more.”

Epanalepsis (figure of speech, Inst. 9.3.28-29): The figure in which one repeats the same word twice in a row, (or on both ends of a parenthesis).

Epanodos, (Regressio) (figure of speech, Inst. 9.3.35-36): The figure in which one reiterates the same words while further distinguishing meaning; the repetition may also serve to mark a contrast, e.g., “Iphitus too with me and Pelius came, Iphitus bowed with age and Pelias Slow-Limping with the wound Ulysses gave.”

Epithet (Epitheton) (trope, Inst. 8.6.40-43): The figure, which is rare in oratory, and is solely for ornament. An epithet cannot stand by itself, but only stands with the proper name as an augment to that name.

Exemplum (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.49.62): The figure in which there is a citation of something done or said in the past, along with the definite naming of the doer or author.

Expeditio (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.29.40-41): The figure in which we have enumerated the several ways by which something could have been brought about, and all are discarded except the one on which we are insisting; e.g., “Since it is established that the estate you claim as yours was mine, you must show that you took possession of it as vacant land, or made it your property by right of prescription, or bought it, or that it came to you by inheritance. Since I was on the premises, you could not have taken possession of it as vacant land. Even by now you cannot have made it your property by right of prescription. No sale is disclosed. Since I am alive, my property could not have come to you by inheritance. It remains then, that you have expelled me by force from my estate.”

Frequentatio (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.40.52): The figure in which points scattered throughout the whole case are collected in one place so as to make the speech more impressive or sharp, or accusatory; e.g., “He is the betrayer of his own self respect, and they waylayer of the self respect of others; covetous, intemperate, irascible, arrogant; disloyal to his parents, ungrateful to his friends, troublesome to his kin; insulting to his betters, disdainful of his equals and mates, cruel to his inferiors; in short he is intolerable to everyone.”
 
Homoeoptoton (Similiter Cadens) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.20.28; Inst.  9.3.78-79): The figure in which, in the same period, two or more words appear in the same case with like terminations; e.g., “Am I to praise a man lacking in virtue, but abounding in good luck (Hominem laudem egentem virtutis, abundantem felicitates)?” And again, “This man places all his hope in money; from wisdom is his soul withdrawn.  Through diligence he acquires riches, but through negligence he corrupts his soul (huic omnis in pecunia speas est, a sapientia est animus remotus; diligentia conparat divitas, neglegentia corrumpit animum. Et tamen, cum ita vivit, neminem prae se ducit hominem).”

Homoteleuton (Similiter Desinens) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.20.28; Inst. 9.3.77): The figure in which the endings of the words are similar, although the words are indeclinable; e.g., “You dare to act dishonorably, you strive to talk despicably, you live hatefully, you sin zealously, you speak offensively (Turpiter audes facere, nequiter studes dicere, vivis invidiose, delinquis studiose, loqueris odiose).”

Hypophora (Subiectio) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.24.33-34): The figure in which one asks questions of adversaries, or of oneself, and answers with what ought or ought not to be said, making oneself look good, and the adversary look bad.

Hyperbaton (Transgressio) (trope, Rhet. Her. 4.32.44; Inst. 8.6.62-67): The trope which upsets the normal word order by means of anastrophe or transposition; e.g., (Anastrophe): “I think the immortal gods have given this to you on account of your virtue (hoc vobis deos immortales arbitror dedisse virtute pro vestra).” (Transposition): “Unstable fortune has exercised her greatest power on this creature. All the means of living well chance has jealously taken from him (Instabilis in istum plurimum fortuna valuit. Omnes invidiose eripuit bene vivendi casus facultates).”

Hyperbole (Superlatio) (trope, Rhet. Her. 4.33.44; Inst. 8.6.67-76): The figure in which one exaggerates the truth, whether for the sake of magnifying or minimizing something. This figure is used independently or with comparison; e.g., (Independently): “But if we maintain concord in the state, we shall measure the empire’s vastness by the rising and the setting of the sun.” (With comparison from equivalence): “His body was as white as snow, his face burned like fire.” (With comparison from superiority): “From his mouth flowed speech sweeter than honey.”

Irony (Illusio) (trope, figure of thought, Inst. 8.6.54-59; 9.2.44-51): The figure in which the meaning is contrary to the words uttered, understood from context or delivery. Quintilian gives the following Greek words which represent the same concept: σαρκασμός· ἀστεϊσμός· ἀντίφρασις· παροιμία (sarcasm, urbane wit, contradiction, proverbs). In the figurative form the speaker disguises his entire meaning, more than just words, the entire situation may be contrary to the intended meaning; e.g.,  “rejected by him, you migrated to your boon companion, that excellent gentleman (virum optimum), Metellus,” in which the irony lies in two words (virum optimum).

Isocolon (Conpar) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.20.27; Inst. 9.3.80): The figure comprised of cola (see colon above) which consist of virtually equal number of syllables; e.g., “the father was meeting death in battle; the son was planning a marriage at home. These omens wrought grievous disasters (In proelio mortem parens oppetebat, domi filius nuptias conparabat; haec omina gravis casus administrabant).”

Litotes (Deminutio) (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.38.50): The figure in which we say that by nature, fortune, or diligence, we or our clients possess some exceptional advantage, and, in order to avoid the impression of arrogant display, we moderate and soften the statement of it; e.g., “This, men of the jury, I have the right to say—that by our labor and diligence I have contrived to be no laggard in the mastery of military science.” (Use of “no laggard” instead of saying that he was “the best.”).

Maxim (Sententia) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.17.24): This figure is a saying drawn from life which shows concisely either what happens or ought to happen in life; e.g., “Every beginning is difficult.” And “A free man is that man to be judged who is a slave to no base habit.”

Metalipsis
(trope, Inst. 8.6.38-39): The trope in which one provides a transition from one trope to another; e.g., calling Χείρων the centaur Ἥσσων (both of which mean inferior).

Metaphor (Translatio) (trope, Rhet. Her. 4.24.45; Inst. 8.6.4-18): The trope in which a word applying to one thing is transferred to another, because the similarity seems to justify the transference; e.g., “The recent arrival of an army suddenly blotted out the state.”

Metonymy (Denominatio) (trope, Rhet. Her. 4.32.43; Inst. 8.6.23-28): The trope which draws from an object closely akin or associated, an expression suggesting the object meant, but not called by its own name. This is accomplished in several ways; e.g., (Greater for the Lesser): “speaking of the Tarpeian Rock and calling it ‘the Capitoline’.”  (Using the name of the thing invented for that of the inventor): “wine” for “Liber” or “wheat” for “Ceres.”  (Using the name of the instrument for the possessor): e.g., “as if one should refer to the Macedonians as follows: ‘Not so quickly did the Lances (Macedonians) get possession of Greece.” 4) (Using the cause for the effect): As in referring to someone doing something in war might say, “Mars forced you to do that.” And several other examples: effect for cause, container for content, content for container. 

Notatio (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.50.63-4.51.65): The figure in which one describes a person’s character by the definite signs which, like distinctive marks, are attributes of that character; e.g., The author gives a rather lengthy story of a man who parades around as if he were rich, but is actually poor. Throughout, by telling a story of this mans words and deeds, he describes his character with remarkable clarity. Further, the author writes, “Character delineations of this kind which describe the qualities proper to each man’s nature carry very great charm, for they set before our eyes a person’s whole character, of the boastful man, as I undertook to illustrate, for the envious or pompous man, or the miser, the climber, the lover, the voluptuary, the thief, the public informer—in short, by such delineation any one’s ruling passion can be brought into the open.”

Onomatopoeia (Nominatio) (trope, Rhet. Her. 4.31.42; Inst. 8.31-37): The trope which suggests to us that we should ourselves designate with a suitable word, whether for the sake of imitation or of expressiveness, a thing which either lacks a name or has an inappropriate name; e.g., (Imitation): “Our ancestors, for example, said ‘roar (rudere),’ ‘bellow (mugire),’ ‘murmur (murmurari),’ ‘hiss (sibilare).’” “After this creature attacked the republic, there was a hullabaloo (fragor) among the first men of the state.”

Paralipsis (Occultatio) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.27.37): The figure in which we say that we are passing by, or do not know, or refuse to say that which precisely now we are saying; e.g., “I do not mention that you have taken monies from our allies; I do not concern myself with your having despoiled the cities, kingdoms, and homes of them all. I pass by your thieveries and robberies, all of them.”

Parenthesis (Interpositio, Interclusio, Paremptosis) (figure of speech, Inst. 9.3.23-24): The figure in which there is an interruption of the continuous flow of our language by the insertion of some remark.

Parhessia (Licentia) (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.36.48; Inst. 9.2.27-29): The figure in which, when talking before those to whom we owe reverence or fear, we yet exercise our right to speak out because we seem justified in reprehending them, or persons dear to them, for some fault. One may follow parhessia up with praise to mollify the hearers, or use feigned parhessia, using pretence of frank speech to gain the support of the audience; e.g., “You wonder, fellow citizens, that every one abandons your interests? That no one undertakes your cause? Blame this on yourselves; cease to wonder…&c.”

Paronomasia (Adnominatio) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.21.29-4.23.32; Inst. 9.3.66-67): The figure in which by modification of sound or a change in letters, there is a close resemblance between verb or noun, so that similar words mean dissimilar things; e.g., “This one who boasts and displays himself so magnificently was sold (as a slave) before he came to Rome (Hic qui se magnifice iactat atque ostentat, venīt (veneo: to be sold [as a slave]) antequem Romam venĭt (venio: to come)).”  The author calls these word plays. It can also occur when the words are not quite so close: e.g., “Who am I, whom am I accusing, whom am I benefitting (qui sim, quem insimulem, cui prosim)?”

Period (Continuatio) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.19.27): The figure in which there is a close packed and uninterrupted group of words expressing a complete thought. Best used in three places: (Maxim): e.g., “Fortune cannot much harm him who has built his support more firmly upon virtue than upon chance.” (Contrast): e.g., “For if a person has not placed much hope in chance, what great harm can chance do him.” (Conclusion): e.g., “But if fortune has her greatest power over those who have committed all their plans to chance, we should not entrust our all with her, lest she gain too great a domination over us.”

Periphrasis (Circumitio) (trope, Rhet. Her. 4.32.43; Inst. 8.6.59-61): The trope in which one expresses a simple idea by means of circumlocution; e.g., “The foresight of Scipio crushed the power of Carthage,” instead of just saying, “Scipio crushed Carthage.”

Permissio (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.29.39): The figure in which we indicate in speaking that we yield and submit the whole matter to another’s will. This figure helps in producing pity; e.g., “Since only soul and body remain to me, now that I am deprived of everything else, even these, which alone of many goods are left to me, I deliver up to your power. You may use and even abuse me in your own way as you think best; with impunity make your decision upon me, whatever it may be.”

Personification (Conformatio) (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.53.66): The figure which consists in representing an absent person as present, or in making a mute thing, or one lacking form articulate, and attributing to it a definite form and a language or certain behavior appropriate to its character; e.g., “But if that great Lucius Brutus should now come to life again and appear here before you, would he not use this language?  ‘I banished kings; you bring in tyrants. I created liberty, which did not exist; which I created you do not wish to preserve…”

Pleonasm (Expolitio)
(figure of speech, figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.42.54, Inst. 9.3.45-46): The figure which consists in dwelling on the same topic and yet seeming to say something ever new; e.g., “No peril is so great that a wise man would think it ought to be avoided when the safety of the fatherland is at stake. When the lasting security of the state is in question, the man endowed with good principles will undoubtedly believe that in defense of the fortunes of the republic he ought to shun no crisis of life, and he will ever persist in the determination eagerly to enter, for the fatherland, any combat, however great the peril to life.” And, “You have decided, you have passed sentence, you have given judgment,” and again, “he departed, he went, he burst forth, he was gone.”

Polyptoton (klisis) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.21.29-4.23.32; Inst. 9.3.36-37. Cf. Theon, 101 for klisis): The figure in which the cases of the words are changed, e.g., “Alexander of Macedon, with consummate toil from boyhood trained his mind to virtue. Alexander’s virtues have been broadcast with fame and glory throughout the world. All men greatly feared Alexander, yet deeply loved him. Had longer life been granted to Alexander, the Macedonian lances would have flown across the ocean (Alexander [nominative] Macedo summo labore animum ad virtutem a pueritia confirmavit. Alexandri [genitive] virtutes per orbem terrae cum laude et Gloria vulgate sunt. Alexandrum [accusative] omnes maxime metuerunt, idem plurumum dilexerunt. Alexandro [dative] si vita data longior esset, trans Oceanum macedonum transvolassent sarisae).” And again, “Is this your father? Do you still call him father? Are you your father’s son (Pater hic tuus? Patrem nunc appellas? Patris tui filius)?”

Polysyndeton (figure of speech, Inst. 9.3.50-54): The figure in which there is the use of many connecting particles. One may repeat the same conjunctions, or use different ones.

Prolepsis (Praesumptio) (figure of thought, Inst. 9.2.16-18) The figure in which we forestall objections as to what we are about to say.

Prosopopoiia (Sermocinatio, Ethopoia, Mimesis) (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.42.55; Inst. 9.2.29-37; 9.2.58-63): The figure in which one puts in the mouth of some person language in keeping with his character. Imitation of other person’s characteristics, serves to excite the gentler emotions. Usually consists in banter, but may be concerned with words or deeds; e.g., “The wise man will think that for the common weal he ought to undergo every peril. Often he will say to himself ‘Not for self alone was I born, but also, and much more, for the fatherland. Above all, let me spend my life, which I owe to fate, for the salvation of my country.’”

Ratiocinatio (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.16.23): The figure in which one asks the reason for every statement made and then gives the answer; e.g., “It is a good principle which our ancestors established, of not putting to death any king captured by force of arms. Why is this so? Because it were unfair to use the advantage vouchsafed to us by fortune to punish those whom the same fortune had but recently placed in the highest station.”

Rhetorical Question (Interrogatio) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.15.22): The figure in which one asks questions to reinforce the argument; e.g., “So when you were doing and saying and managing all this, were you, or were you not, alienating and estranging from the republic the sentiments of our allies.”

Simile (Imago) (figure of thought, Rhet. Her. 4.49.62): The figure in which there is a comparison of one figure with another, implying a certain resemblance between them. This is used either for praise or censure; e.g., (Praise): “He entered the combat in body like the strongest bull, in impetuosity like the fiercest lion.”

Symploce (Complexio) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.14.20; Inst. 9.3.31): The figure in which there is the combined use of antistrophe and anaphora: repeating both the first and the last words in a clause or phrase; e.g., “One whom the Senate has condemned, one whom the Roman people has condemned, one whom universal public opinion has condemned.”

Synechdoche (Intellectio) (trope, Rhet. Her. 4.33.44; Inst. 8.6.19-22): The trope in which the whole is known from the part, or the part from the whole. Look also for the singular from the plural and vice versa; e.g., “Were not those nuptial flutes reminding you of his wedding (i.e., the flutes for the whole marriage).”

Synoikeiosis
(figure of speech, Inst. 9.3.64): The figure in which there is a connection of two different things: e.g., “The miser lacks that which he has no less than that which he has not.”

Synonymy (Interpretatio) (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.18.38-39): The figure in which one does not duplicate the same word, but substitutes another with the same meaning; e.g., “You have overturned (evertisti) the republic from its roots (radicitus); you have demolished (deiecisti) the state from its foundations (funditus).”

Traductio (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.14.20-21): The figure in which there is a repetition of certain words without offense to style. Also, the same type of figure is used when using a word with the same spelling in different ways; e.g., “One who has nothing in life more desirable than life cannot cultivate a virtuous life,” or “I would leave this place, should the senate grant me leave.”

Transitio (figure of speech, Rhet. Her. 4.26.35; Inst. 9.3.70-74): The figure which briefly recalls what has been said, and likewise sets forth what is to follow; e.g., “My benefactions to the defendant you know; now learn how he has requited me.”

Zeugma (figure of speech, Inst. 9.3.62-64): The figure in which a number of clauses are all completed by the same verb.

Notes:
This list contains 81 figures.  80 of these come directly from either Quintilian or Pseudo-Cicero.  One figure, Alliteration/Assonance, comes indirectly from from the Rhetorica ad Herennium as it is mentioned but not listed as a figure of speech (Rhet. Her. 4.12.18).  Therefore, for my definition I have relied on Lausberg's Handbook of Classical Rhetoric.